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To understand the dynamics of legislative gridlock, as well as account for the 
mixed and often conflicting findings in the divided government literature, this paper 
posits that the previous unidimensional approach of using divided government as an 
explanatory variable of interest fails to accurately reflect the changing realities of 
American politics since WWII. Two new and interlocking conceptual approaches are 
introduced that expand the dimensionality of legislative gridlock: ideological polarization 
explained through the temporal shift of political parties from a system of moderation and 
universalistic policy outputs, to one where particularistic goals became much more 
common. As studies of divided government center on temporally-bound concepts, they 
ignore most of the inter- and intra-party variation evident throughout the 20
th
 century.              
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Studies of divided government traditionally focus on two broad theoretical 
concepts to explain legislative gridlock: organizational efficiency and electoral 
responsiveness. Based on rational expectations of ambitious politicians, political parties, 
it is believed, organize the diverse geographic interests of elected representatives into 
single governing units able to meet the needs of both member and voter. With the rise of 
legislative gridlock on one hand, and theoretical concerns of responsive governance on 
the other, scholars modeled their research on comparisons between unified and divided 
government. If history has shown that unified governments reconstitute the problems of 
society with vigor and purpose then analyzing government from this dichotomous 
approach should explain much of the variance of legislative gridlock. But in modeling 
their research on unidimensional explanations, the academic community created a 
conflicting body of work: one side arguing divided government causes gridlock the other 
side arguing to the contrary.  
Critics of divided government argue a national government under control of two 
competing parties decreases the probability of enacting quality legislation. Because the 
parties lose the ability to effectively bridge the constitutional checks designed to temper 
impulsive legislation, they usually fail in addressing campaign promises, straining their 
relationship with voters. Divided government, they argue, tends to operate in mediocrity 
or end in failure. From Nixon‟s forced resignation to Clinton‟s political impeachment, 
presidents did not effectively organize a policy agenda backed with majority support 
responsive to the needs of voters. Opponents of this view, argue these findings diminish 
the legislative successes of divided government. Constitutional checks are a fact of 
political life any government must navigate; the terms of negotiating simply shift from a 
 2 
partisan-centered agenda to a bipartisan one. Either way, both regime types must 
accommodate some members to reach a majority; the trick is in adjusting the particulars 
of a bill to ensure wide-ranging support. Moreover, it is not as if all governments during 
unified rule reach this conceptual goal of organizational efficiency and electoral 
responsiveness, never to experience gridlock. Carter, Clinton, Bush II, and now the 
Obama Administration are far from exemplary models of unified government practiced 
by FDR.     
As scholars of divided government were forcing rigid concepts of governmental 
success onto a changing political environment; contemporary political research shifted 
much of its attention to the increased and expanded role of ideological polarization. 
Studies investigated the influence of ideological polarization on mass voting (Fiorina 
2011, Gelman 2009), social and economic inequality (McCarty et al. 2006, Bartels 2010), 
elite-level politics (Rhode 1991, Brewer et al. 2002, Rae 1989, Theriault 2008), and its 
impact on legislative comity (Mann and Ornstein 2008, Sinclair 2006). Scholars of 
divided government, conversely, fail to account for the rise in ideological polarization as 
an additional dimension to explain legislative gridlock.  
Studies of divided government have also fallen short in accounting for temporal 
variation in institutional politics. One assumption is parties operate similarly across time 
and space—a failure in one period can explain failure in all other periods. Yet parties are 
dynamic organizations that change depending on the size of ideological divergent 
members. Thus, where rational explanations of party might prove useful at one moment 
(Aldrich 1995), diverse and wide-ranging explanations of party prove useful at others 
(Ceaser 1978, Hofstadter 1969, Madison 2003 [1787]).  
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I argue that a multidimensional approach to researching legislative gridlock better 
explains the variation in the divided government literature. Introducing a typology that 
includes both regime type and level of polarization, this study advances the theory that a 
historical approach which accounts for the compression of four-party politics as well as 
the current polarized political environment more accurately reflects the governing 
realities parties navigate. The size of a factional coalition can change the ideological 
signature of a party, yet these coalitions do not last as the core group initiates 
mechanisms to push these members out of the party. The result is increased polarization 
and increased levels of legislative gridlock. What affect does this change in party and 
polarization have on government, specifically the constitutional order? While not 
specifically addressed in this study, the implications suggest high polarization based on 
ideology rather than classic definitions of party potentially distorts the constitutional 
separation of powers. If party is centered on ideological diverse interests without the tug 
of moderate influences can party potentially ignore the barriers between branches? 
Recent historical events suggest no. Finally, it should also be noted that this study does 
not preclude divided or unified government as strong indicators of gridlock. It only 
argues ideological polarization accentuates those differences depending on the size and 
influence of factional coalitions within the parties.          
 
The Unified and Divided Government Debate 
 Throughout the 1990s, in what can be described as the golden age of divided 
government research, the political phenomenon of split party control of government 
inspired scholars to spill great amounts of ink researching both its causes and 
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consequences. During this time, two competing explanations on government productivity 
were advanced leaving behind a legacy that produced more questions than answers. 
 Some of divided government‟s earliest critics wrote on what seemed a reaction to 
the growing angst over government inaction. Sundquist (1988) argues that classic 
theories of political science advanced the theory that the function of political parties was 
to bind the branches of government together into a cohesive unit, creating a chain of 
authority that voters could easily relate. Divided government muddled this order of 
authority. No one knew who to assign blame as each party constantly criticized the other. 
If the president failed to get his budget passed, for example, he could blame a 
noncompliant Congress. In return, Congress could counter the president did not provide 
leadership. Sundquist argues that when the branches of government are under the control 
of two different parties an opposition-led Congress should oppose the president since any 
admission of accepting his program is an outright admission of the president as their 
leader—a member of the opposite party! It would be bad politics to follow the leader of 
the opposition party. Each party, then, hides behind a surreptitious veil of ignorance 
while actively engaging in partisan politics. 
 Other scholars echoed these concerns by studying the impact of divided 
government on specific subjects. One argument advanced the theory (Pfiffner 1991) that 
a president cannot always succeed in reaching his policy goals. Two main reasons: an 
assertive Congress and the constitutional check of the separation of powers. While every 
president, regardless if government is unified or not, has to potentially deal with these 
checks, these limitations are amplified when government is divided. Another study has 
argued that divided government forces a president to use his constitutional prerogative of 
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the veto not only to oppose legislation he deems unfit for law, but also as a strategic 
method of protecting his party‟s political position from the opposition (Kernell 1991). 
Divided government is also blamed on the growing deficits of the 1980s. McCubbins 
(1991a, 1991b) argues that the increased spending of the time was not the result of 
Congress abdicating its authority or the political influence of Reagan, but is instead 
attributable to both parties mutually agreeing to increase spending across all functions of 
government rather than one side risking a loss in funding to a core-constituent program. 
Early findings on the consequences of divided government, then, tended to support the 
hypothesis that unified government was simply a better governing arrangement. 
 The notion that divided government stressed the political system was turned on its 
head when Mayhew (1991) presented findings that little difference existed in the quantity 
and quality of legislation enacted between unified and split control of government. Using 
both journalistic and expert opinion, Mayhew‟s approach would forever alter the debate 
on divided government. Others would join Mayhew in what Colman (1999) termed the 
revisionist approach to split party control of government. The trends in these studies posit 
that there are alternative explanations to government inaction and that the critics of 
divided government tend to overemphasize the structural limitations of split-party 
control. From explanations that government action is stalled because the political parties 
can no longer control their political message nor control who runs for office (Malbin 
1994) to the theory that the causes of gridlock actually fluctuates between divided 
government, electoral-induced localism, congressional decentralization, and presidential 
leadership failure (Rieselbach 1996), and from historical explanations that modern 
politics is not divided but fragmented due to the loose party affiliations of voters (Silbey 
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1996). Others argues along more traditional lines that all governments, regardless of they 
are unified or divided, have to meet supermajority hurdles (Krehbiel 1998, Brady and 
Volden 2006), limit debate on ideological issues (Quirk and Nesmith 2006), and account 
for the bicameral complexities of Congress (Binder 2003). These and other accounts 
actually highlight the dynamic nature of American politics.  
 Not content with these alternative explanations, scholars doubled their efforts to 
test both Mayhew‟s theory as well as expand our understanding of the limits of divided 
government. One study (Edwards et al. 1997) introduced the viewpoint of the president 
and his support of important legislation. The authors found that the president is more 
likely to oppose important legislation when government is divided than when it is unified. 
Similar findings have been presented for agenda setting (Edwards and Barrett 2000). In 
this study the authors find that the president has less of an advantage in setting the agenda 
when government is divided. In one of the more comprehensive studies to classify the 
differences between major and landmark legislation Howell et al. (2000) find that 
landmark legislation is less likely to pass when government is divided while the 
difference is less pronounced with major legislation. Other studies that have contributed 
to the debate include findings that coalition formation is difficult during periods of 
divided government (Thorsen 1997), party responsiveness is weaker when government is 
divided (Colman 1999), and the negativity between the political parties is easier to 
convey when government is divided (Groeling and Kernell 2000).       
 
Tally of the Findings            
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 While both sides in the debate present compelling and well argued evidence, the 
mixed record poses questions concerning the literature‟s conceptual and methodological 
approaches. For one, since both sides of the ledger observe the same political history, the 
same political actors, and in some cases use the same indicators, this paper argues this 
mixed record is attributable to the literature‟s longstanding practice of modeling divided 
government as the main indicator of interest. Increasing explanatory power relies on a 
reconceptualization of what causes legislative gridlock. Second, this approach overlooks 
the changing political environment from a system were moderate coalitions within parties 
forced ideological diversity on the entire political process to a system where inter-party 
conflict, or between party conflict, seemed to handcuff all levels of government. The 
deterministic nature of the divided government literature is one that ignores the 
multidimensionality of an evolving political system. 
 The purpose of this paper, then, is to shift the debate away from the causal 
indicators created by Mayhew and his critics to one that incorporates a holistic approach 
to understanding legislative gridlock. In fact, both sides of the debate are correct in one 
respect—their explanation accurately depicts one snapshot of a larger political picture. 
Divided government does cause legislative gridlock as many contend, but this conclusion 
only reflects the conflict of a polarized political system. Ignoring temporal variability 
resulted in inconsistencies in the literature. Pierson (2004) advances the argument that 
using one theory to explain a long temporal view of American politics limits the 
explanatory power of that theory. One must apply a mix of theories and methods that 
includes a historical perspective to their approach as no one theory or paradigm can 
comprehensively and accurately describe the dynamics of politics.  
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American political history between WWII and the 21
st
 century is such a case in 
point. Where divided government during the Clinton Administration was filled with 
examples of intense political conflict—a narrative that at the outset seems to support the 
critical view of divided government—the scorecard for Truman‟s Administration is far 
different. While the two parties did have substantial differences, the political atmosphere 
of the moment forced Truman to approach political confrontation differently than Clinton 
would forty year later. Since Clinton‟s core partisans in Congress were highly cohesive 
and most moderates were purged from the party, he benefited form using an 
obstructionist posture since the opposition could not convince enough Democrats to join 
with then. Truman, on the other hand, was forced to accept most of the Republican 
Party‟s policy positions since many of the southern conservative Democrats aligned with 
the Republican majority (Conley 2000). Still, the accomplishments during Truman‟s two 
years of divided government1 are fairly impressive which raises questions to some of the 
findings the divided government literature used in classifying the Truman and Clinton 
years under the same rubric. 
         
The Role of Party, the Growth of Ideological Polarization, and A Theory of Gridlock 
A theory of legislative gridlock and divided government presented here is 
centered on the changing role of party and the growth of ideological polarization. This 
theory argues that gridlock, though traditionally attributable to divided government, is 
better explained through the lens of ideological polarization. Figure 1 presents a 
parsimonious typology of conditions under which legislative productivity operates, 
                                                 
1 Taft-Hartley, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, stabilization of farm prices, a federal clean water 
 9 
especially across large blocks of political history. The two determining factors for 
legislative productivity are the type of government the system operates under, unified or 
divided, and the level of ideological diversity, moderate or polarized. The assumption of 
this theory, regardless of the operational conditions of government, is the level of 
ideological diversity—the size of a moderate block of members who on one or more 
issues vote against the core of their party—dictates the level of gridlock in the system. As 
the figure shows, regardless if government is unified or divided, the level of productivity 
is, under a system of moderate political conflict, theoretically, quite high. The divided 
government and moderate cell is labeled mixed-productive since partisan forces can and 
do have an effect on the success of a bill becoming law.  
Figure 1: Typology of Conditions for Government Productivity   
      
  Ideological Diversity 
  Moderate Polarized 
          
 Divided Mixed-Productive Gridlock 
Government Type          
          
 Unified Productive Gridlock/Coalition Dependent 
          
 
A political system under high levels of ideological polarization, on the other hand, 
confirms much of the divided government literature regarding the productivity of split 
party control and gridlock. Yet this theory also suggests the literature is incorrect in 
overemphasizing the ability of a unified regime in both sidestepping the constitutional 
hurdles and in organizing an effective and responsive front under conditions of high 
polarization. This theory argues that the only strategy a unified majority can use in 
                                                                                                                                                 
act, and the Berlin airlift, to name but a few.  
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maintaining the link of responsiveness between party and voter during a polarized period 
is to ensure they have the coalitional support of the entire party. Success for a unified 
regime, then, is not dependent on the power of discourse or the ability of the party to 
effectively navigate veto points. Instead, success for a unified regime during periods of 
high polarization is entirely dependent on the size of their majority. Because the 
probability of enticing ideological divergent members to cross party lines and support a 
policy most within the party oppose is quite low, and because most unified governments 
since the Carter administration have been marginally tight,2 political success for a unified 
government is entirely majority size dependent.        
This theory of legislative gridlock is also temporally flexible where contemporary 
theories of party and divided government is not. A general consensus in the divided 
government literature is parties operate as groups of rational actors and the expectations 
that govern behavior at one period are similar across all periods; the preferences that 
dominate the agenda at time t bear on the preferences at time t + n. This theoretical 
assumption is centered on the notion that parties are incapable of change as the structure 
of partisan control forces each side into a predetermined playbook. Thus, according to the 
divided government theorists, split party control operates in either the divided/polarized 
quadrant or, for those who argue the difference between both regimes is slight, shares 
similar successes with unified government in the unified/moderate quadrant. Obviously, 
such arguments fail to account for the level of ideological polarization and number of 
moderate partisans in the process. From the argument that divided government, by its 
                                                 
2 Excluding the Obama Administration since this electoral victory created near supermajority status in the 
House. 
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very nature, yields higher levels of legislative gridlock to arguments that constitutional 
checks and exogenous forces dictate the existence of gridlock, both camps fail to consider 
the changing structure of party in both its operation and diversity of membership.   
 Articulated by Aldrich (1995), a theory of rational party politics argues ambitious 
politicians seek to maximize their electoral chances through the mechanism of party: 
incumbents use party to secure reelection by providing benefits to those who elected 
them. The theoretical thrust of the argument centers on a quid pro quo between elected 
representative and voter. For the purposes of this project, it is important to note a conflict 
exists between this understanding of party and unified and divided government. On the 
one hand, this understanding of party is centered on enforced party discipline (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993) and voting blocks of cohesive likeminded members (Rhode 1991, 
Aldrich and Rhode 2000). Any notion of collective responsibility to voters outside of a 
geographic region is not considered in the equation—such actions, if they occur, are 
irrational. Where critics of divided government argue the inherent problem of split party 
control of power is the unbending will of preferences, or simply the rigid preferences of 
party create conditions where gridlock occurs more frequently, proponents contend 
cohesive and disciplined parties actually add in overcoming constitutional hurdles if 
legislation accommodates both parties. In sum, both sides suggest disciplined and 
cohesive parties exist.3 The debate is over the impact of legislative output during unified 
and divided government.    
                                                 
3 Most of the literature describes party politics as one side opposing the other or one party aiding the other. 
Rarely does the narrative describe defection of members of one party aiding the opposition.  
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This theory of party also, accentuates, and by its very nature supports, a polarized 
party system where groups of likeminded members are expected to take control of 
government then use power to return benefits to those who elected them. A founding 
understanding of party, on the other hand, reluctantly accepts political parties as vehicles 
of competition and questions whether this view of party, theoretical or actual, is 
beneficial to universal policy outputs. There seems, then, to be confusion between terms 
such as party, ideology, and polarization. Party in the Madison sense is a collective 
compromise between different groups in order to limit one group of faction from 
surreptitiously controlling power. It was important to introduce many wide-ranging 
interests into the political process in order to halt one particular interest or faction from 
obtaining the levers of government (Gillespie 1993). Rational perspectives of party seem 
to ignore this understanding and push a definition of party that is quite opposite to a 
traditional meaning of party, yet argue that party is the impetus for all government action. 
Thus, government inaction is party-centered rather than ideology or faction as Madison 
describes it. 
Modern theorists of American government, and divided government scholars in 
particular, tend to overlook this distinction, arguing that fault lies in the system of 
government rather than with those that operate within it. If early predecessors of 
government ignored or were unaware of the concepts of party organization and electoral 
responsiveness contemporary scholars believe are the tenets of an effective working 
government, it was because they placed the onus of enacting important law into the hands 
of those elected to debate the issues of the moment. Blame for failing to enact a particular 
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law was not placed on the structure of the system. Instead, failure signified that a 
particular outcome lacked standing with a broad consensus of the moment4.  
The second conflict in the party literature is transaction costs. Parties, by nature of 
their cohesive structure, the argument continues, reduce the political price of doing 
business in government—navigating constitutional hurdles, unifying behind a common 
message, and so forth. Where the divided government literature tends to disagree over the 
distribution of these costs—critics contend the cost is an inherent part of divided 
government, opponents of this view contend the cost is held within the constitutional 
checks of government—there seems to be little disagreement in the fact that cohesive 
parties, in one way or another, can transcend these costs. But this view of party overlooks 
the level of polarization that parties, historically, negotiate. Further, negotiating to reduce 
transaction costs, contrary to arguments of rational choice theorists, is not necessarily 
lower within than between parties. At certain times, such assumptions can be made. But 
as the variability of history has shown, parties, more often than contemporary theories of 
politics are willing to acknowledge, must negotiate within and between parties.         
The broad history of party and divided government is a cyclical pattern replete 
with intra-party factions and varying levels of party polarization. Such a notion is 
relatively absent in both the party and divided government literature. Figure 2 presents a 
time series of party polarization in the House of Representatives from the first to the 110
th
 
Congress. One defining feature of the series is that besides the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries, the only other period in American history where polarization reached its 
                                                 
4 As a side note, there are some modern studies of institutional politics producing work suggesting parties 
operate outside of the traditional mold of party (Wood 2009, Bensel 1987).    
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highest point is during the contemporary political period. Furthermore, besides a 
precipitous dip during the Era of Good Feelings, 1816 to 1824, the post-New Deal era 
records the lowest levels of ideological polarization across the history of American 
politics. While the causes of polarization are different between both periods, its one 
defining feature is a contraction of ideological moderation of intra-party factional groups.  

























Polarization from the post-Reconstruction period illustrates the dynamic nature of 
parties and divided government. The first period of high polarization, from the late 1880s 
to 1932, exemplified the conflict of localized and regional interests. Even with a potential 
party-splitting issue as monetary policy, the Democratic Party, by 1896, united behind a 
policy of silver-backed currency, minimizing the potential for factions to break from the 
party. Party organization was strong and unbending. Wilson (1885) described these 
parties as parochial-based machines intent on maintaining their local hold on power. This 
practice failed to bridge the constitutional gaps in solving society‟s ills—presidents were 
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weak and both Congress and the machines took advantage. Not only did the parties of the 
time control all aspects of government, worse, Wilson argued, political parties fractured 
the separation of powers because they failed to provide the president with national 
authority perpetuating local power at the expense of national interest. Silbey (1991) 
argued that not only were parties organizationally strong, they also articulated important 
issues of the moment, tightening the association with voters since party echoed their 
concerns. Politics was polarized because both parties held a strong grip on all aspects of 
its operation from the nominating process, to a unified message, and removing factional 
members from their ranks.    
Another feature of this period is the high frequency of divided government. 
Between the elections of 1868 and 1896, government was divided 9 of 14 times—a 
number comparable to our own period of divided government. Silbey (1996) argues that 
this early period of divided government, as opposed to the heightened period of divided 
government one hundred years later, reflects a system of strong political parties vying for 
control of government. To Silbey, instances of divided government are time bound. 
Galloway (1961) substantiates this argument in his historical narrative of extreme party 
conflict and the adoption of Reed‟s Rules into the standard practices of the House. 
Because the level of partisan differences stalled the chamber in gridlock, the Republican 
leader effectively removed the parliamentary tactic of the disappearing quorum. Fast 
forward 60 years to the Eisenhower Administration and Congress is dominated by the 
seniority system and factional coalitions that formed in direct response to the strict 
procedural rules needed in a polarized system. In a system where party organization is 
weak and individual interests influence the types of policy, as well as the degree of 
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restrictiveness on procedural freedoms, conflict is dispersed since party, at the request of 
membership, loosens the mechanisms that control factional coalitions (Schickler 2001). 
Partisan conflict, as this paper argues, is articulated in a theory of ideological polarization 
rooted in the strength of parties.          
One of the more interesting eras in institutional politics, roughly from 1933 to 
Watergate, is highlighted by the lowest party polarization in history. Schattshneider 
(1942), would describe this period as one relatively bereft of conflict, an era of natural 
bipartisanship. Others would write that parties were diverse coalitions and appealed to 
voters on similar issues (Key 1964, Sorauf 1964, Eldersveld 1964). Coalitional dynamics 
of the time was a mix of intra-party disagreements between southern conservative 
Democrats, liberal northern Republicans, and their respective party leadership. Milkis 
(1993) argues these coalitions formed because FDR actively sought to weaken the 
traditional role of parties so as to expand his policy agenda. Consequently, to achieve 
these policy goals the president needed strong support in Congress and promptly turned 
his back on the southern system of institutionalized racism. In the end, this appeasement 
to secure majority status to aid in policy change would lead to future coalitional battles 
between liberals and conservatives of the Democratic Party that would pave the road to 
polarized politics.     
Divided government during this period of low polarization was markedly different 
than divided government of the 1990s. For one, the large coalitions of southern 
Democrats and northern Republicans forced presidents and party leadership to legislate 
from moderate policy positions. Policy was written with a middle-out strategy to 
accommodate party defectors or entice members of the opposition and was rarely written 
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from extreme ideological positions—a strategy the next polarized generation would fail 
to grasp. Writing in a time when political science used forgotten theories of iron triangles 
and pluralism, Lowi (1979) sized up the era as one where party meant little and satisfying 
as many interests as possible meant everything. In sum, cartel theories and conditional 
theories of party played much less of a role in the governing structure of this period. 
Mayhew (1991) and scholars of pivotal politics (Krehbiel 1998, Brady and Volden 2006) 
accurately discern that, at times, party politics means less than critics of divided 
government, knowingly or not, admit. But where this theoretical approach to divided 
government comes up short, a theory of fluctuating levels of ideological polarization 
enhances our understanding of government productivity since partisan control of 
government is dependent on the freedom of factional partisans. As the gridlock typology 
suggests, moderate polarization and divided government does not preclude the possibility 
of legislative success.           
The contemporary period of high ideological polarization is profoundly different 
than the previous period. Bond and Fleisher (1990) argue that the relationship between 
Congress and the president is centered on an interaction between party affiliation and 
ideology. As we have seen, this interaction can change influencing the scope and reach of 
policy outputs. Improving on Burns‟ (1963) theory that institutional politics is based on 
four not two parties, Bond and Fleisher further that this categorization is better explained 
in the relationship of conservatives and liberals with their respective party. But later work 
by Bond and Fleisher (2000), argues that this view of institutional politics is no longer 
valid, as moderate members of each party were no longer welcome into the „new‟ party 
system. Beginning in the late 1980s, after liberal Democrats and conservative 
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Republicans purged many of the moderates from their ranks (Rae 1989, Rhode 1991, Rae 
1994), and elected officials realigned and became a reflection of the representative voters 
were seeking (Black and Black 1992, 2002), a partisan environment formed that lacked 
moderate compromise.  
With the steady purge of moderate members from the parties, finding enough 
support for large legislative agendas became much more difficult. As policy was 
increasingly written from extreme positions and tight majority margins and unreachable 
supermajority veto-proof positions meant a governing environment prone to gridlock, all 
government, unified or divided, was prone to polarized gridlock. Johnson and Broder 
(1996), for example, blame the failure of Congress to pass healthcare reform in 1994 on 
the Clinton Administration violating this moderation approach. Rather than listen to the 
prescient political advice of Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee Dan 
Rostenkowski, who suggested a moderate bill to ensure passage, the Administration 
chose instead to listen to more extreme members of the party. With a shrinking 
ideological median, this example would become a typical political scene in an 
increasingly polarized environment. Divided government, too, as many of Mayhew‟s 
critics would contend, did increase the level of legislative gridlock that pundits and 
political commentators would lament in print and television. Clearly the typology 
accounts for limits in the divided government literature as well as instances of gridlock 
under unified government.     
In sum, a theory of unified and divided government is rooted in a historical view 
of party. Partisan conflict is a complex amalgam of inter- and intra-party heterogeneity 
that fluctuates depending on the size and intensity of intra-party factional coalitions. 
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When a party is unified behind a strong coalition of likeminded members the natural 
predisposition for conflict that is inherent in politicians shifts attention to the opposition 
party. On the other hand, when a party has a large coalition of members that lack the 
same partisan unity as the leadership, attention is shifted inwards. This view of inter-
governmental conflict, factional politics, and ideological polarization, it should be noted, 
does not dismiss the rational choice explanation of party and its subsequent use in the 
divided government literature. Nor does this theory imply that the literature ignores 
legislative failures during unified government. Instead, it argues that these theories do in 
fact explain institutional behavior but only at certain periods and under certain 
conditions. This theory contributes to the debate by adding the explanatory indicator of 
ideological polarization into the calculus of legislative gridlock. The history of American 
institutional politics is far too dynamic to leave to one theory and one concept of party 
behavior.     
 
Data and Methods 
 To capture the influence of polarization on legislative productivity an individual-
level measure is used. The traditional approach to measuring the productivity of unified 
and divided government uses aggregate-level measures that count the number of bills 
passed during each Congress. I attempt a different approach and use individual-level 
measures of ideology and polarization to determine how these individual characteristics 
contribute to the overall level of gridlock in government. I proceed by describing a 
different measure of dependent variable used in this study followed by a description of 
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the explanatory variables and finally the empirical tests used. Appendix A provides a 
description of how certain measures are calculated.  
 The dependent variables are individual measures of legislative gridlock. Because 
this study argues that ideological polarization influences gridlock and those influences 
are captured through the moderate tug of factional coalitions, using counts of important 
laws passed seems inadequate to capture the ideological polarization in a given chamber 
at a given time. Further, since the number of laws passed varies from Congress to 
Congress, it is difficult to compare uneven counts across time. Individual-level gridlock 
scores have the benefit of measuring how much gridlock each member contributes to the 
overall level of gridlock in the system. For this measure I use individual recorded votes 





I currently use three5 different dependent variables: Mayhew‟s extended dataset of 
important legislation,6 and final passage and conference reports the president is recorded 
taking an aye7 or nay position.8 I use Mayhew‟s (1991) laws and presidential positions 
influenced by Edwards et al. (1997) as my dependent variable for two reasons. First, 
Mayhew‟s study is the most influential study in the divided government literature and is 
the impetus for pushing research on the subject forward. I include presidential positions 
                                                 
5 Due to space considerations I have also calculated procedural votes on which the president has taken a 
position. Procedural votes comprise amendments, recommitals, and other motions. The ayes for his data set 




 House (12 roll 
calls each) and the largest during the 99
th
 House (51 roll calls). The nays of this data set comprises 1146 




 House (2 roll calls) and the 
largest during the 96
th
 House (122 roll calls).    
6 This data set comprises 387 roll calls; the smallest number of roll calls occurring during the 86
th
 House (5 
roll calls) and the largest during the 93
rd
 House (30 roll calls).  
7 This data set comprises 1311 roll calls; the smallest number of roll calls occurring during the 80
th
 House 
(8 roll calls) and the largest during the 90
th
 House (129 roll calls).   
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since any study of divided government is rooted in a systemic study of government. At its 
core, scholars study divided government to understand the relationship between the 
executive and members of Congress. As such, a position on which the president publicly 
takes a stand warrants attention. I exclude roll calls on important legislation since the 
laws used seem fairly subjective. All roll call votes and positions are taken from The 
Policy Agendas Project, the ICPSR database, and the online CQ Almanac. Finally, the 
gridlock measure is calculated as the proportion of times the member voted in opposition 
to a specific roll call.9  
 I divide the explanatory variables for this study into three different categories: a 
base polarization model, a coalition or regional model, and an institutional model. 
Ideological dynamics of the House are measured using DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole 
and Rosenthal 2007). The main variables of interest are member polarization and 
ideological distance between members and the president. Ideological distance from the 
president is simply the first dimension ideological distance of a member from the 
president; this measure is a proxy10 for the first dimension measure and, from a systemic 
view, is easier to interpret. Further, since this study is concerned with the systemic 
influence of ideology, rather than describe the relative conservative or liberal measure of 
members, it is theoretically appealing to describe the level of ideological divergence of 
congressional members toward a given president.  
                                                                                                                                                 







 House (1 roll call each) and the largest during the 100
th
 House (90 roll calls).   
9 For example, if a president is recorded as taking a nay position on a vote to recommit a bill back to 
committee and a member votes aye on that vote, then that member is considered gridlocked for that vote.     
10 The coefficients are the same whether one uses first dimension scores or my member distance from the 
president. This is because the ideological value of each member is subtracted from a single value of the 
president.  
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 The regional explanatory variables differentiate between homogenous members of 
a party and those members who lack sufficient party unity. Building on theories presented 
by Burns (1963), Rae (1989), and Bond and Fleisher (1990), I separate members by their 
party unity scores into six different categories. For the Democrat Party, I separate 
members into a southern faction, a unified core, and all other members who lack unity 
but are not from the south. I follow Key‟s (1948) eleven state classification of southern 
states. For the Republican Party, I separate members into a northern11 faction, a unified 
core, and all other members who lack unity but are not from the northern states. I use 
these classifications since, historically, the dominate factions within both parties have 
been liberal northern Republicans (Rae 1989) and southern conservative Democrats (Key 
1948, Black and Black 1987). One feature of this study, and a slight divergence from 
traditional studies on southern politics, is that I do not classify all southern members 
under the southern rubric, for example. This is because I calculate a southern 
conservative or liberal northerner differently: all defectors are labeled as those with a 
party unity score that is one standard deviation below the party median. Theoretically, 
party unity scores are a better indicator of party cohesion since they capture how often 
members vote with fifty percent of their party in direct opposition against fifty percent of 
the other party. In other words, this measure removes members from the core party who 
should not be considered strong partisans and creates a factional coalition based on actual 
partisan support. I use party unity scores from Poole‟s DW-NOMINATE database. The 
coding classification for each coalition is a dummy variable were “1” is the respective 
                                                 
11 Northern states are classified as Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, 
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  
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coalition with all others coded as “0.” I leave the core Republican Party as the base 
category.  
One potential criticism of this study is there is no way of determining if 
government is unified or divided. I compensate for this by creating a dummy variable for 
members of the president‟s party where “1” signifies a representative is a member of the 
president‟s party compared to all others. While this coding schema does not distinguish 
between a government that is unified and divided, it does signify members of the 
president‟s party and how this classification influences a gridlock score. It should be 
noted, though, that the theoretical thrust of this study is that divided government must be 
a poor measure since the literature has produced such a mixed set of findings. 
Furthermore, because this is an individual-level study that centers on the moderate 
influence of divergent coalitional members, including divided government as a measure 
is, theoretically, beside the point. To further allay any possible criticisms I created an 
institutional feature12 measure comprised of dummy measures that account for first 
dimension ideology by grouping members into majority and supermajority categories. I 
accomplish this by sorting all members by their first dimension score and code all 
members who fall within the ≤ 218 range—the simple majority block—and the ≥ 219 and 
≤ 291 range—the supermajority block. Each member is coded a “1” for their respective 
standing. The base category is all members above the 292 range. Another point to 
consider with this measure is that it should differentiate between majority support for 
legislation, or the president‟s legislation, but also capture the dynamics of ideological 
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positioning the further one moves from the president‟s core voting block. Thus, 
comparable to the conditional party government thesis (Rhode 1991, Aldrich and Rhode 
2000), the more unified, in this case ideologically, a party and the stronger the parties 
numerical majority, the less gridlocked the chamber will be when government is unified.  
The statistical tests I use for this study are ordinary least squares (OLS). I estimate 
27 different OLS regressions for each of the three models and each of the three dependent 
variables for a total of 243 regressions. Because the distributions for each dependent 
variable were questionable in regards to normality, I tested for heteroscedasticity and 
corrected each model as required. Future iterations of this model will have to be tested for 




Polarization and Gridlock 
        
 Figure 3 presents the mean gridlock scores for Mayhew‟s laws, presidential ayes, 





 House, regardless if government is unified or divided, is relatively stable 
across time. Furthermore, both Mayhew‟s laws and presidential ayes are relatively low, 
or high if one views this graph from a unified government perspective, and fairly 
consistent: the long-term average for both measures being .219 and .231. One possible 
inference of this finding is certain laws transcend politics. That is, regardless of 
ideological polarization, the type of regime, and even the party that controls government, 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 This coding classification should be taken with caution as members obviously fluctuate in their positions 
given the issues. So, there is no true way of knowing where a member stood on a certain bill nor there is no 
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laws get passed, or members simply vote yes on these bills. Another possibility is these 
laws are the bills everyone, in some form or capacity, have negotiated for and are willing 
to live with. In that case, one could argue Mayhew cherry-picked his research for bills 
that would have made any study of government look bipartisan.   
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 At its core, politics, for better or worse, is a narrative of conflict and one has to 
look within the data to unearth where the conflict resides. Figure 2 shows presidential 
nays, bills the president took a position against, have a much higher gridlock score: 
average .684. On these bills, more than half of the House tends to vote against the 
president suggesting there is a political dynamic within institutional politics of severe 
conflict when a majority of the House and the president cannot agree on a bill. This 
finding also suggests that there is a constant level of conflict on nay positions as well as 
Mayhew‟s laws and aye positions.  
                                                                                                                                                 






 Table 1 (presented in Appendix B) presents OLS results for the base polarization 
model from the 80
th
 to the 106
th
 House. All of the models hold up well and most 
coefficients reach traditional levels of statistical significance. Three important findings 
for the Mayhew data are worth noting. First, the findings show that a member‟s 
ideological distance from the president has the strongest effect on the level of gridlock, 
supporting the main theoretical hypothesis of the paper. As expected, the relative 
successes of the Eisenhower and Nixon divided governments are attributed to lower 
levels of member polarization and smaller ideological distances between members and 





Furthermore, during Houses where the ideological distance between members and the 
president is higher, the effect of member polarization is lower. Also, it is not until the 
Reagan era that the influence on member polarization reaches some of its highest levels.  
A second point to note is even though the constant for each model follows the 
traditional understanding of divided government—that is, unified governments enjoy 
either a smaller level of gridlock as a base or in most cases have negative gridlock scores 
indicating, ceteris paribus, unified governments have an easier starting point—the size of 
the coefficient for the distance between members and the president is highest across all 
unified governments. This finding suggests ideologically divergent members during 
unified government resist the majority‟s policies. On the other hand, during divided 
government the effect of this coefficient is much lower suggesting some form of 
compromise is reached that the majority of the opposition party votes on a bill the 
president signs. Interestingly, this trend is altered during the divided government years of 
the Clinton Administration. Here, the affect of ideologically divergent members is in the 
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negative direction suggesting strong compromise between the Gingrich Republicans and 
the Democrat president. Thus, even though the budget battles and political impeachment 
of the president are listed under the infamous heading of „reasons divided government is 
bad,‟ the fact remains both parties agreed to such legislation as the American Investors 
Protection Act, Commodity Futures Modernization Act, the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997, and the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, to name a few. Whether this legislative success is 
attributable to bipartisan compromise or Clinton‟s ability to adapt to the political 
environment, these findings support the study‟s hypothesis that lower levels of 
ideological polarization ease the way for legislative success.  
The final point to note is the influence of the president‟s party on overall levels of 
gridlock. Interestingly, for members of the president‟s party, the coefficient tends in the 
negative direction during divided governments. While the expectation, according to the 
divided government literature, is members of the president‟s party will support his 
positions—a core argument of the literature that places the root of all conflict in party 
position—the evidence suggests a majority party under unified government struggles 
with factional members within their party. In some cases the evidence shows that the 
affect of a positive gridlock coefficient negates the beneficial position most unified 
governments start under. The only divided governments where this is not the case is 
Truman and the 80
th
 and the six years of divided government under Clinton. In these 
instances, when the president needed his partisans most, they tended to abandon him. 
This phenomenon also suggests an inherent problem within the Democrat Party which I 
will address in the next section. 
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For the presidential aye dependent variable, many of the findings are quite similar 
to those found under Mayhew‟s laws so the same general inferences are drawn as above. 
The interesting dependent variable is positions on which the president took a nay stance. 
Here, every constant is positive regardless of government type indicating an area of 




 House,13 the affect 
of ideological distance between member and president is highest when government is 
unified, suggesting when the president is in opposition to a certain bill a coalition forms 
around a bill that the normal core partisans generally would not support. During divided 
governments, the evidence suggests most members support a president‟s opposition to a 
bill they disapprove. A more probable explanation is members of the House are 
ideologically closer to Republican presidents and as such are less inclined to oppose, for 
example, Reagan over a bill he opposes than Carter. The negative coefficients for 
member polarization are mostly likely picking up both polarized parties in support of 
their respective presidents. As expected, there is a difference in the magnitude between 
president‟s party and ideology supporting this paper‟s claim that the distinction of party 
probably means less than the pull of ideology.      
 
Coalitional Politics and Gridlock 
Figures 4 and 5 present descriptive summaries of polarization scores for the main 
coalitions in institutional party politics. This paper has argued that unified or divided 
government is not the main cause of gridlock. Instead, one must look to the amount of 
ideological polarization within the political system. Further, this paper has argued that 
                                                 
13 The number of roll calls for these first few Congresses is too low to confidently infer conclusions. It 
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polarization increases as the size of moderate coalitions diminishes. In both graphs, the 
levels of ideological polarization have been fairly constant across time. As the core 
partisans of each party remained constant at the 0.30 level (for ease of interpretation we 
can say that the main branch of the parties were roughly 30 percent polarized) while the 
factional coalitions were generally half as polarized. It was not until after the parties 
began purging moderate members from their ranks that the level of polarization for each 
group increased dramatically. Currently, this study does not control for the size of each 
coalition, meaning the ideological weight of the measure is assumed constant across 
time.14  
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seems presidents during this time took very few negative positions on final passage votes.  
14 This is a point that will have to be corrected in further editions of this project. For example, during the 
89
th
 House the size of the southern coalition was 65 members strong while during the 106
th
 House it had 
diminished to 19. 
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Table 2 (presented in Appendix B) presents regression results that control for 
factional coalitions. As expected, controlling for individual member polarization, as well 
as ideological distance from the president, accounts for much of the gridlock in the 
system. Turning to the southern conservative coalition, a fluctuation is evident that at first 
glance seems counterintuitive. During the Eisenhower and Nixon presidencies, southern 
conservatives were more likely to vote against Mayhew laws and positions the president 
supported than their unified northern partisans. The opposite was the case for the 
Kennedy and Johnson years. One inference to draw from this finding is that all presidents 
during this period, in some form or another, signed legislation antithetical to southern 
preferences. Since Democrats controlled the legislative agenda they pushed through bills 
the main coalition of southerners opposed. In order to compensate for this loss in 
majority strength, northern liberal Republicans crossed the aisle and supported liberal 
Democrats and the president. The evidence is presented in the northern Republican 
 31 
column. For the unified Democrat and liberal Republican rubric, every coefficient that 
reaches statistical significance trends in unison. Though the magnitude is less for liberal 
Republicans, there is no mistake that support for Mayhew‟s laws and positions the 
president supported (bills undoubtedly important and in some cases targeted toward 
minorities) was achieved or enhanced by bipartisan support. Thus, even though liberal 
Democrats and Republicans were gridlocked toward Republican presidents, they were far 
less gridlocked than southern conservatives. As the hypotheses of this paper argue, 
moderate ideological diversity, regardless of government type, can create bipartisanship.  
 
Institutional Features and Gridlock 
Most alternative explanations of legislative gridlock focus on constitutional 
limitations such as majority and supermajority support. In an attempt to capture the 
influence of majority size at the individual level, I test a ranking system that lines all 
members by ideological intensity. Similar to schoolchildren forming a line by height, I 
create a similar line but one divided by ideology where both ends of the line have the 
“tallest” members. Figures 5 through 8 compare the progression of members from the 









 divided governments with 
Democratic presidents and Republican controlled House. The obvious finding from these 
graphs is the ideological diversity at the 218 majority point. For the 81
st
 House, this 
position was extremely moderate. Compared to the 103
rd
 House we see an ideology score 
90 times more liberal than a member who would have occupied this theoretical position 
44 years earlier. The divided government graphs reveal a different trend. While the 
 32 
ideological position of the 218
th
 member is relatively the same (.151 versus .182), the real 
point of interest is the supermajority position. Where the position in 1947-48 was held by 
a moderate Democrat with an ideology score of 0.005 (Olin E. Teague, TX), the same 
position in the 106
th
 House was held by a Democrat with an ideology score of -0.309 
(Ron Klink, PA). This suggests, and supports the argument, that the dynamics of 
negotiating is much different in a polarized environment than in one with moderate 
members or factions.  
Figure 6: 81
st
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    Table 3 presents regression results for the institutional model controlling for 
majority position, supermajority position, member polarization, and ideological distance 
from president. The expectation for this model is during periods of high polarization, the 
ideological measures should have a larger affect on gridlock than institutional features. 
Similar to the previous models, ideological distance from the president has the strongest 




, have a 
negative gridlock score. Thus, institutional features create a governing environment that 
creates gridlock—a conclusion we would expect. On the other hand, the measures for 
majority and supermajority positions do not hold up as well across time as the 
polarization coefficients. At some points, the values comport with what we would expect 
to find—during the unified 103
rd
 House the majority coefficient is negative, -0.2254, and 
the supermajority coefficient has a smaller magnitude, -0.1103. This suggests that as the 
president‟s coalition decreases, or as the votes that are need for passage require votes 
outside of the core gridlock increases. At other points, the values are similar regardless if 
the coefficient is majority or supermajority. One finding of this model that supports the 
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paper‟s hypotheses is the effect of institutional features, as measured in this paper, loses 
statistical significance in the contemporary period. As the table shows, the magnitude of 
polarization and ideological distance from the president increases except for the Clinton 
divided government for Mayhew‟s laws and positions Clinton supported. On positions 
Clinton opposed, majority size was statistical insignificant while ideological distance 
from the president had an extremely large effect on gridlock.   
   
Conclusion 
 Research on divided government has vastly expanded our knowledge of inter-
government relations between Congress and the president. But the mixed findings in the 
literature leave behind questions of both the theoretical and methodological approaches 
of these studies. This study has approached the topic of divided government from a 
different theoretical perspective and has attempted to measure this theory from an 
individual rather than aggregate level as most previous works attempt. The main 
theoretical objection against the divided government literature has been the relative void 
of including ideological polarization as an explanatory variable. Where most political 
science research approach topics in contemporary politics through the lens of 
polarization; divided government scholars do not. A consequence of studying 
institutional politics from the vantage point of unified versus divided government is a 
potential loss of accurate explanatory power that comports with political realities.      
    The findings of this study tend to support its main hypotheses. First, ideological 
polarization, as measured by individual-level polarization and ideological distance from 
the president, shows the strongest effect on gridlock. Whether through Mayhew‟s laws or 
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bills the president publicly supports, higher levels of polarization decreases support for 
bill making them harder to pass. Second, regional coalitions have had an influence on the 
level of gridlock in the House. The cross-regional switching during the 1960s and 70s 
shows the dramatic change in coalitional politics and its influence on today‟s politics. 
This regional distinction has a far smaller effect than it did 20 years ago. Third, a measure 
of institutional features shows ideological polarization is more important today as a 
structural wall regardless if government is unified or divided.  
 As his study has argued, the findings presented no way detract from the divided 
government literature and the findings of these studies. Instead, this study hopefully adds 
an unexplored element to the debate that will further advance the profession‟s 
understanding of inter-governmental relations. The thrust of this study was to bridge 
some of the holes on the subject by adding an explanation that augments rather than 
detracts past work.  
 One objection this study raises, though, is the confusion in the semantic field over 
the definition of party, ideology, and polarization. All of these terms are used 
interchangeably, sparking confusion and inconsistency. Concepts which portray, with a 
certain degree of accuracy, the realities of the political world prove beneficial to better 
our theories and measures. A case in point is my use of party and polarization. One 
counter to this study that could be easily advanced is there is no difference between party, 
ideology, and polarization. In other words, my findings actually describe the workings of 
party argued by party theorists and divided government scholars. Here I disagree. The 
tenets of the party literature center on formations of likeminded members that make 
collective decisions through party leadership. Though I try not to make a straw-man 
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argument against this definition of party and its use in the divided government literature, 
I do acknowledge that the literature does address factional members within party. But I 
find a difference between party defined classically and that defined rationally. As modern 
party theorists argue, one group essentially fights the other for control of government, 
after which they reward those who elected them. This definition of party is ideological-
based and factional in a polarization sense. Yet this definition is different that what 
traditional party explanations argue. The only reason a modern definition of party 
comports with my definition of polarization and faction is we are both looking at the 
same thing yet using different terminology. Further, a modern view of party seems party-
centric because larger amounts of ideologically similar members are making collective 
decisions. This is much different than how parties operated 50 years ago. Definitions of 












Appendix A: Measurement of Independent Variables 
I operationalize continuous independent variables as follows. 
1. Ideological distance between members and president: ezMemi IDIDx Pr  
2. Member polarization score is calculated in two ways. First, I calculate the ideological 
polarization measure for the entire chamber: MedIDMedIDi pDemX Re . I then take the 
chamber polarization score and divide by 2. This score is the absolute moderate point in 
the chamber. I then calculate the individual polarization score 




















Appendix B: Tables of OLS Regression Results 
Table 1: Gridlock and Polarization - Base Model       
Congress Constant Mem Pol Prez ID 
Prez 
Party N Adj R2 
Mayhew's Laws      
80 0.0691** .6629*** 0.0155 0.0722*** 443 0.4861 
81 -0.0442^ 0.4605*** 0.2786*** 0.0985*** 438 0.3839
a
 
82 0.0987* 0.6585*** 0.3771*** -0.1321*** 441 0.4397 
83 0.1346*** 0.2322*** -0.2255*** -0.1342*** 435 0.5207
a
 
84 0.3130*** 0.1853** 0.4419*** -0.1021*** 437 0.2745
a
 
85 0.6256*** 0.0648 0.8290*** -0.3816*** 441 0.4900
a
 
86 0.4774*** 0.1443^ 0.5797*** -0.4026*** 437 0.3219
a
 
87 -0.3301*** 0.2999*** 0.8867*** 0.1198*** 444 0.7766
a
 
88 -0.3421*** 0.2806** 0.9699*** 0.1361*** 440 0.7877
a
 
89 -0.1351* 0.0588 0.9759*** 0.2491*** 441 0.7592
a
 
90 -0.1526** 0.0956 0.5797*** 0.2630*** 436 0.4672
a
 
91 0.1615*** 0.2295*** 0.1961*** -0.0645*** 442 0.3396
a
 
92 0.4908*** 0.3236*** 0.5314*** -0.3184*** 438 0.4701
a
 
93 0.3204*** 0.2656*** 0.4145*** -0.1538*** 440 0.5882
a
 
94 0.5922*** 0.1912*** 0.7633*** -0.1926*** 438 0.6706
a
 
95 -0.0336 0.3315*** 0.4232*** 0.0077 437 0.5427
a
 
96 -0.0731* 0.2810*** 0.4483*** 0.0984*** 439 0.4539
a
 
97 0.4101*** 0.3479*** 0.2090*** -0.2360*** 437 0.2435 
98 0.3130*** 0.5518*** 0.4243*** -0.0628^ 437 0.3788 
99 0.2221*** 0.4175*** 0.2401*** -0.0758** 437 0.2963 
100 0.3701*** 0.4839*** 0.5758*** -0.0137 439 0.8615
a
 
101 0.4809*** 0.4388*** 0.5807*** -0.2004*** 438 0.4254
a
 
102 0.2959*** 0.5268*** 0.3856*** -0.1702*** 437 0.3092 
103 -0.1411* 0.4511*** 0.8161*** 0.0359 437 0.8137
a
 
104 0.1227*** 0.4074*** -0.2675*** 0.0738** 445 0.7721
a
 
105 -0.0650^ 0.4842*** -0.0572^ 0.1365*** 441 0.524 
106 0.1201* 0.6420*** -0.3567*** 0.0732^ 439 0.7386
a
 
       
President Aye Position      
80 -0.1944*** .3518*** 0.4621*** 0.2790*** 442 0.3177
a
 
81 -0.0043 0.2602* 0.8151*** 0.0299 438 0.8122
a
 
82 -0.2457*** 0.6752*** 1.104*** 0.1018** 442 0.7451
a
 
83 0.5219*** 0.2158*** 0.3566*** -0.4452*** 435 0.6142
a
 
84 0.3663*** 0.1751*** 0.4519*** -0.1840*** 437 0.5101 
85 0.5664*** 0.1962*** 0.6404*** -0.3309*** 441 0.6007 
86 0.5941*** 0.1946*** 0.6792*** -0.3326*** 438 0.4378 
87 -0.2772*** 0.1914*** 0.8511*** 0.1156*** 444 0.8522
a
 
88 -0.1809*** 0.1897** 0.7881*** 0.0442^ 440 0.8716
a
 
89 -0.0468 0.0981 0.7543*** 0.1274*** 441 0.8190
a
 
90 -0.0418 0.0865^ 0.5051*** 0.1443*** 436 0.6983
a
 
91 0.3366*** 0.2645*** 0.2884*** -0.1963*** 442 0.3577
a
 
92 0.4261*** 0.3107*** 0.3996*** -0.2909*** 438 0.4686
a
 
93 0.3877*** 0.2740*** 0.3930*** -0.1858*** 441 0.4799
a
 
94 0.5045*** 0.2845*** 0.5066*** -0.2330*** 438 0.4322
a
 
95 -0.1328*** 0.2286*** 0.7245*** 0..1105*** 437 0.8329
a
 
96 -0.1145*** 0.2622*** 0.6408*** 0.0910*** 439 0.849 
97 0.0791*** 0.2756*** -0.1367*** -0.0847*** 437 0.5532 
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98 0.3539*** 0.2797*** 0.2206*** -0.1386*** 437 0.1697 
99 0.0730** 0.1921*** -0.2694*** -0.0004 437 0.5211 
100 0.1959*** 0.1926*** 0.0921*** -0.0416** 439 0.1594 
101 0.3240*** 0.4182*** 0.3561*** -0.1376*** 438 0.3991 
102 0.3573*** 0.3362*** 0.2601*** -0.1931*** 436 0.2818 
103 -0.1137*** 0.3813*** 0.6196*** 0.0013 437 0.9295
a
 
104 0.0602*** 0.2127*** 0.0326 -0.0048 445 0.3315
a
 
105 -0.1353*** 0.3365*** 0.1417*** 0.0863** 442 0.4024
a
 
106 -0.0791* 0.3353*** 0.1568* 0.0811** 439 0.3004 
 
Table 1: Gridlock and Polarization, con't       
Congress Constant Mem Pol Prez ID 
Prez 
Party N Adj R2 
President Nay Position      
80 0.4628*** -0.2264* 0.8221*** -0.2218*** 420 0.6348
a
 
81 0.6861*** -0.9682*** 0.9595*** 0.0628^ 364 0.6399
a
 
82 0.8268*** -0.1353* 0.3511*** -0.7448*** 421 0.8565
a
 
83 0.7285*** -0.2292** -0.4164*** 0.1586*** 419 0.0706
a
 
84 0.8413*** -0.1636** -0.2064*** -0.4961*** 437 0.7500
a
 
85 0.7730*** -0.2093*** -0.0902** -0.2262*** 441 0.6355 
86 0.7362*** -0.2192*** -0.3266*** -0.3881*** 438 0.8739
a
 
87 0.3062*** -0.4187*** 0.9113*** -0.2308*** 444 0.8648
a
 
88 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
89 0.8276*** -0.1287** 0.3160*** -0.0392* 439 0.5679
a
 
90 0.6149*** -0.1843*** 0.5127*** 0.0227 434 0.5905 
91 0.6521*** -0.1983** -0.4720*** -0.0734** 435 0.7563
a
 
92 0.1324** 0.1191 -0.8432*** 0.1198** 438 0.6699
a
 
93 0.5199*** -0.2121* -0.5857*** -0.0066 441 0.8308
a
 
94 0.3760*** -0.2555*** -0.8454*** -0.0257 438 0.8732
a
 
95 0.3664*** 0.0214 0.1868*** 0.0139 437 0.1732 
96 0.8528*** -0.1206*** -0.0282 -0.0592*** 439 0.0885 
97 0.4845*** -0.4301*** -0.7137*** 0.0257 437 0.8642
a
 
98 0.4745*** -0.3788*** -0.6394*** -0.004 437 0.9261
a
 
99 0.4051*** -0.4232*** -0.7864*** 0.0157 437 0.9318
a
 
100 0.5076*** -0.4126*** -0.6756*** 0.0486*** 439 0.9427
a
 
101 0.4566*** -0.3289*** -0.6925*** 0.0119 440 0.9282
a
 
102 0.4112*** -0.2206*** -0.6545*** -0.0495*** 436 0.9098
a
 
103 0.6268** -0.4395*** 0.2628** -0.0872 434 0.3042 
104 0.5914*** -0.4402*** 0.5725*** -0.2135*** 445 0.9449
a
 
105 0.5189*** -0.3356*** 0.5675*** -0.1718*** 442 0.9382
a
 
106 0.6625*** -0.4291*** 0.4441*** -0.2062*** 439 0.9380
a
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Table 2: Gridlock and Polarization - Coalition 
Model               
Congress Constant Mem Pol Prez ID S Dem 
Other 
Dem Uni Dem N Rep Other Rep N Adj R2 
Mayhew's Laws          
80 0.0537^ .6560*** 0.0301 0.0725** 0.0244 0.0928*** -0.0098 0.0683* 443 0.5012
a
 
81 -0.1242** .5684*** .3294*** 0.1693*** 0.2869** 0.1381*** 0.1187** 0.1862*** 438 0.4687
a
 
82 0.0499 .7117*** .4204*** -0.1043* 0.0862 -0.1041* 0.0218 0.0538 441 0.4376 
83 -0.0302* .2824*** -0.1910*** 0.1881*** 0.1287** 0.1650*** 0.0994*** 0.1079** 435 0.5437
a
 
84 0.1631*** .3142*** 0.4528*** 0.1861*** 0.1963** 0.1004** 0.2502*** -0.0456 437 0.3502
a
 
85 0.1932*** .1844** 0.7027*** 0.4697*** 0.3642*** 0.2921*** 0.0882* 0.045 441 0.5201
a
 
86 0.0148 .2734** 0.4612*** 0.5429*** 0.1083 0.3234*** 0.1184** 0.0904** 437 0.3982
a
 
87 -0.1448* .4527*** 0.6164*** 0.1560*** 0.0619^ -0.0830* -0.0515^ -0.0279 444 0.8160
a
 
88 -0.0327 .2857*** 0.6236*** 0.1404*** -0.0304 -0.1312** -0.1893*** -0.0724^ 440 0.8405
a
 
89 0.081 .1987* 0.5570*** 0.2717*** 0.0831 -0.0699 -0.1257** -0.1254** 441 0.8519
a
 
90 -0.0184 .2534** 0.2770*** 0.2846*** 0.1559*** 0.0264 -0.0732* -0.0755** 436 0.5665
a
 
91 0.0412** .3415*** 0.1188** 0.1085*** 0.0303 0.0076 0.0672*** 0.0205 442 0.4045
a
 
92 0.0577** .5487*** 0.3154** 0.4053*** 0.3010*** 0.1510*** 0.0715^ 0.0208 438 0.5661
a
 
93 0.1302** .3400*** 0.3359*** 0.1698*** 0.1867*** 0.0910* 0.0167 -0.0194 440 0.6084
a
 
94 0.3778** .2543*** 0.4134*** 0.1332*** 0.1205* -0.0955** -0.1874*** -0.0855* 438 0.7321
a
 
95 0.0326 .4804*** 0.2619*** 0.0560* 0.0546^ -0.1164*** -0.0144 0.0637 437 0.594 
96 -0.0916 .3219*** 0.3635*** 0.0975** 0.1064** 0.0304 -0.0349 -0.0134 439 0.4617
a
 
97 0.1766*** .3585*** 0.2747*** 0.2189*** 0.3548*** 0.2935*** 0.0911* 0.0015 437 0.2573 
98 0.1965*** .6590*** 0.3478*** 0.1191** 0.0968 -0.0018 0.0611 -0.0511 437 0.391 
99 0.0993*** .5177*** 0.1966*** 0.0890** 0.1923*** 0.0364 0.0401 0.0365 437 0.3353
a
 
100 0.3244*** .5490*** 0.5325*** 0.0391 0.0328 -0.0251 0.0083 0.0302 439 0.8661
a
 
101 0.2094*** .5935*** 0.6012*** 0.2677*** 0.3178*** 0.2182*** 0.1396** 0.1031* 438 0.4316 
102 0.1053*** .5710*** 0.4754*** 0.1802*** 0.2785*** 0.2511*** 0.1242** 0.0212 437 0.3212 
103 0.1670*** .3639*** 0.5412*** -0.0416 -0.1166* -0.2343*** -0.2011*** -0.2497*** 437 0.8437 
104 0.0503* .4415*** -0.2175*** 0.0937*** 0.1133*** 0.1313*** 0.0788*** 0.0675*** 445 0.7856
a
 
105 -0.1939*** .5331*** 0.0367 0.2024*** 0.2269*** 0.2433*** 0.0997*** 0.1289*** 441 0.5627
a
 
106 0.0272 .7821*** -0.3447*** 0.1405** 0.2015*** 0.0935* 0.1472*** 0.0781* 439 0.7565
a
 
           
President Aye Position          
80 -0.2057*** .3844*** 0.4521*** 0.3262*** 0.1727** 0.2752*** 0.1034** 0.0572^ 442 0.3294
a
 
81 0.123 .3241** 0.5960*** 0.0781^ 0.086 -0.1432** -0.1358* -0.0983* 438 0.8620
a
 
82 -0.1922*** .8351*** 0.8510*** 0.1744*** 0.1697** -0.0306 -0.032 0.0611 442 0.7750
a
 




84 0.1517*** .2460*** 0.4176*** 0.2536*** 0.1284*** 0.1601*** 0.0813*** 0.0404* 437 0.5547 
85 0.2030*** .2718*** 0.5295*** 0.3854*** 0.3564*** 0.2520*** 0.0374 0.0451 441 0.6257
a
 
86 0.1915*** .3403*** 0.6247*** 0.4591*** 0.2609*** 0.3034*** 0.1256** 0.2087*** 438 0.5041 
87 -0.1018* .3092*** 0.6090*** 0.1391*** 0.0485 -0.0683* -0.0605** -0.0507^ 444 0.8902
a
 
88 0.0579 .2325*** 0.5019*** 0.0607* 0.0004 -0.1747*** -0.1252*** -0.0501^ 440 0.9192
a
 
89 0.1347* .1994** 0.4133*** 0.1311*** 0.0454 -0.1330** -0.1362*** -0.0505 441 0.9044
a
 
90 0.0664* .2191*** 0.2580*** 0.1587*** 0.1003** -0.0491* -0.0579** -0.0604** 437 0.7963
a
 
91 0.0322^ .4822*** 0.0718^ 0.2509*** 0.1909*** 0.0269 0.0488* 0.0099 442 0.4911
a
 
92 0.0440** .4886*** 0.2609*** 0.3584*** 0.3392*** 0.1867*** 0.0787* 0.0531^ 438 0.5427
a
 
93 0.1468*** .3865*** 0.2631*** 0.2074*** 0.2301*** 0.0813* 0.0105 -0.0318 441 0.5282
a
 
94 0.2694*** .2969*** 0.3610*** 0.1713*** 0.2623*** 0.1061** -0.0857*** -0.012 438 0.4306
a
 
95 -0.0278 .3120*** 0.5539*** 0.1282*** 0.0891** -0.0252 -0.0582** -0.0623** 437 0.8649
a
 
96 -0.0414 .3579*** 0.5034*** 0.1073*** 0.1414*** -0.0183 -0.0191 -0.0357^ 439 0.8810
a
 
97 -0.002 .2907*** -0.0301 0.0871*** 0.1994*** 0.1776*** 0.1154*** 0.0539** 437 0.6092
a
 
98 .2027*** .3032*** 0.1846*** 0.1215*** 0.2074*** 0.1072** -0.0068 -0.0092 437 0.1711 
99 .0719*** .2173*** -0.1585*** -0.0137 0.1361*** 0.0945*** 0.0870** 0.0909** 437 0.5664 
100 .1417*** .2237*** 0.1082*** 0.0481* 0.0844** 0.0555* 0.0319^ 0.0245 439 0.1748
a
 
101 .1511*** .4942*** 0.3606*** 0.1469*** 0.2386*** 0.1414*** 0.0667* 0.0589^ 440 0.4105 
102 .1301*** .4103*** 0.2793*** 0.2234*** 0.2684*** 0.2092*** 0.0757** 0.0299 436 0.2935 
103 -0.0078 .3819*** 0.5099*** -0.0096 -0.0298 -0.1078*** -0.0668** -0.0659* 437 0.9399
a
 
104 0.0615** .2653*** 0.0038 0.0334* 0.0022 -0.0350* -0.0024 0.0141 445 0.3535 
105 -0.1795*** .4566*** 0.1175*** 0.1507*** 0.1609*** 0.0675* 0.0693*** 0.0779* 442 0.4768
a
 





Table 2: Gridlock and Polarization - Coalition Model, con't             
Congress Constant Mem Pol Prez ID S Dem 
Other 
Dem Uni Dem N Rep 
Other 
Rep N Adj R2 
President Nay Position          
80 0.5606*** -0.1006 0.6250*** -0.0084 -0.2921^ -0.3866*** -0.3446*** -0.0071 420 0.6789
a
 
81 0.6972*** -1.010*** 0.9664*** 0.0292** 0.1193* 0.0688 -0.0548 -0.0059 364 0.6410
a
 
82 0.7976*** 0.0809 0.2754*** -0.6209*** -0.5699*** -0.8131*** 0.078** 0.0777** 421 0.8642
a
 
83 0.9078*** -0.2505* -0.5124*** -0.1461* -0.2750* -0.2406*** -0.1109 -0.1406* 419 0.0987
a
 
84 0.3184*** -0.1447** -0.1586** 0.5446*** 0.1059 0.5623*** 0.0049 0.2283*** 437 0.7950
a
 
85 0.5576*** -0.2410** -0.1137** 0.1940*** 0.1697* 0.2118*** -0.034 0.0163 441 0.6251 
 43 
86 0.3178*** -0.1739*** -0.1733*** 0.3933*** 0.2020^ 0.5139*** 0.1294*** 0.2384*** 438 0.8941
a
 
87 0.5148*** -0.2459*** -0.6082*** -0.1674*** -0.3993*** -0.4587*** -0.0779* -0.0289 444 0.8897 
88           
89 0.9228*** -0.1046** 0.1587*** -0.0551** -0.0479 -0.1619*** -0.0917** -0.0337 439 0.5986
a
 
90 0.7108*** -0.1832** 0.3679*** -0.0063 -0.014 -0.0923* -0.1470*** -0.0217 434 0.6088 
91 0.6068*** -0.2545*** 0.3293*** 0.0714* 0.1429** 0.1940*** 0.0868* 0.061 435 0.7769
a
 
92 0.3343*** -0.045 -0.5661*** -0.1478*** 0.1291^ 0.1089* 0.0623 0.0843^ 438 0.7072
a
 
93 0.5402*** -0.2650** -0.3991*** 0.0319 0.0197 0.1650** 0.1354** 0.0900* 441 0.8610
a
 
94 0.3739*** -0.3197*** -0.5441*** 0.0347 0.0910* 0.2665*** 0.2069*** 0.1002* 438 0.9198
a
 
95 0.3713*** -0.0012 0.1936*** 0.021 -0.0550^ 0.0182 0.0069 -0.0414 437 0.1814 
96 0.8963*** -0.1574*** -0.0597* -0.0773*** -0.0876*** -0.0880*** -0.0739** -0.0642* 437 0.099 
97 0.5438*** -0.4808*** -0.5862*** -0.0154 -0.0597 0.0842** 0.0392 0.0979* 437 0.8767
a
 
98 0.4859*** -0.3972*** -0.5509*** 0.005 0.004 0.0801** 0.0669** 0.0401 437 0.9334
a
 
99 0.4338*** -0.4288*** -0.6716*** 0.0207 -0.0347 0.0837** 0.1058*** 0.0004 437 0.9409
a
 
100 0.5904*** -0.4797*** -0.6126*** -0.0709*** -0.0560** 0.0077 -0.0007 -0.0138 439 0.9482
a
 
101 0.4845*** -0.3631*** -0.5574*** -0.0059 0.0215 0.1108*** 0.0846*** 0.0089 440 0.9418
a
 
102 0.3657*** -0.2316*** -0.4869*** 0.0817* 0.1075** 0.2038*** 0.1110*** 0.0501 436 0.9234
a
 
103 0.6814*** -0.4567*** 0.2119* -0.0176 -0.2205* -0.1319 -0.0091 0.0774 434 0.3168 
104 0.6876*** -0.3812*** 0.4543*** -0.1701*** -0.2435*** -0.3488*** -0.0995*** -0.1005*** 445 0.9556
a
 
105 0.7792*** -0.3328*** 0.3207*** -0.2382*** -0.3372*** -0.4414*** -0.1740*** -0.1945*** 442 0.9639
a
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Table 3: Gridlock and Polarization - Institutional Model       
Congress Constant Mem Pol Prez ID Maj Coal Super Maj N Adj R2 
Mayhew's Laws       
80 0.1053*** .7457*** 0.0288 -0.0744** 0.0399 443 0.5035
a
 
81 -0.0723** .5410*** .2735*** 0.0962*** 0.0709*** 438 0.407 
82 0.0057 .7224*** .4763*** -0.0591 0.0134 441 0.4242 
83 0.0272 .1725** -0.4113*** -0.001 0.0171 435 0.4788
a
 
84 0.1509*** .3221*** 0.5475*** 0.1821*** 0.1242** 437 0.2791
a
 
85 0.2358*** 0.1113 0.6831*** 0.2669*** 0.1359** 441 0.2751
a
 
86 0.0959** 0.1637 0.2494* 0.1303* 0.2410*** 437 0.0986
a
 
87 -0.1111^ 0.3178*** 0.6413*** -0.0679^ 0.0268 444 0.7657
a
 
88 0.0922 0.1758** 0.5306*** -0.2015*** -0.0594 440 0.7878
a
 
89 0.2485*** 0.0735 0.3991*** -0.2069*** -0.0065 441 0.7160
a
 
90 0.0201 0.0838 0.3340*** 0.0646 0.064 436 0.2430
a
 
91 0.0729*** 0.2764*** 0.1698** 0.0479 0.0656** 442 0.3301
a
 
92 0.1451*** 0.3861*** 0.3437*** 0.1575** 0.1512*** 438 0.2188
a
 
93 0.1521*** 0.2889*** 0.3264*** 0.0832* 0.0577 440 0.4865
a
 
94 0.3592*** 0.3164*** 0.5318*** 0.0013 0.1347*** 438 0.6409
a
 
95 0.1121** 0.4163*** 0.2003*** -0.1646*** -0.0325 437 0.5742 
96 -0.0128 0.3151*** 0.3661*** 0.0279 0.0513 439 0.4319
a
 
97 0.1489*** 0.4120*** 0.2181*** 0.2437*** 0.1272*** 437 0.1637 
98 0.1901*** 0.6566*** 0.2697*** -0.0654 0.058 437 0.3943
a
 
99 0.1031*** 0.4902*** 0.1539*** 0.0079 0.0703* 437 0.2973 
100 0.3255*** 0.5335*** 0.4738*** -0.0724* 0.0075 439 0.8682
a
 
101 0.2104*** 0.5925*** 0.6080*** 0.2277*** 0.2407*** 438 0.4225 
102 0.0982*** 0.5808*** 0.3675*** 0.1586** 0.1546*** 437 0.2923 
103 0.1541^ 0.3895*** 0.5285*** -0.2254*** -0.1103* 437 0.8223
a
 
104 0.1994*** 0.4044*** -0.3453*** -0.0053 0.0117 445 0.7673
a
 
105 0.0685*** 0.4781*** -0.1996*** 0.0153 0.0002 441 0.5022 
106 0.2184*** 0.6387*** -0.4319*** -0.0373** -0.0237 439 0.7406
a
 
        
President Aye Position       
80 0.0183 .4931*** 0.4200*** -0.2314*** 0.0287 442 0.2404 
81 -0.0357 .3443* 0.8097*** 0.0275 0.0741* 438 0.8192
a
 
82 -0.1954** .7029*** 0.9157*** 0.035 0.0749^ 442 0.7398
a
 
83 0.1687*** 0.015 -0.2606*** -0.0035 0.0416 435 0.1667
a
 
84 0.1663*** 0.2182*** 0.3851*** 0.1344*** 0.0890*** 437 0.3418
a
 
85 0.2464*** 0.1974*** 0.4574*** 0.1886*** 0.0880** 441 0.2203 
86 0.2795*** 0.2118** 0.3747*** 0.0834^ 0.1929*** 438 0.2563
a
 
87 -0.1018* 0.2262** 0.6455*** -0.0409 0.0484^ 444 0.8405
a
 
88 0.0419 0.1636** 0.5470*** -0.1373*** -0.0191 440 0.8839
a
 
89 0.2198*** 0.1196* 0.3400*** -0.1955*** -0.0397 441 0.8242
a
 
90 0.0857** 0.0828* 0.3128*** -0.0049 0.0425* 437 0.6018
a
 
91 0.1109*** 0.3197*** 0.1545*** 0.0893** 0.1001*** 442 0.1685
a
 
92 0.1170*** 0.3597*** 0.2857*** 0.1898*** 0.1440*** 438 0.1863 
93 0.1792*** 0.3148*** 0.3100*** 0.1210*** 0.0870*** 441 0.3401
a
 
94 0.2340*** 0.4151*** 0.3744*** 0.1148*** 0.2154*** 438 0.3519 
95 0.1018 0.2711*** 0.5335*** -0.0446^ 0.307 437 0.8165
a
 
96 -0.0204 0.3369*** 0.4967*** -0.0276 0.0502* 439 0.8417
a
 
97 -0.0319** 0.3507*** -0.0616^ 0.1504*** 0.1038*** 437 0.5670
a
 
98 0.1871*** 0.3184*** 0.0965* 0.0358 0.0739** 437 0.112 
99 0.0556** 0.2393*** -0.2304*** 0.0337 0.0427^ 437 0.5235 
 45 
100 0.1416*** 0.2178*** 0.0806** 0.033 0.381* 439 0.151 
101 0.1371*** 0.5276*** 0.3900*** 0.1692*** 0.1371*** 440 0.4054 
102 0.1281*** 0.4075*** 0.2081*** 0.1520*** 0.1702*** 436 0.2214 
103 -0.0018 0.4016*** 0.4892*** -0.1192*** -0.0281 437 0.9369
a
 
104 0.0479*** 0.2131*** 0.0395*** 0.0061 0.0202* 445 0.3409
a
 
105 -0.0416* 0.3362*** 0.0505*** -0.0046 -0.0195* 442 0.3817
a
 
106 0.0195 0.3282*** 0.0734*** -0.0258* -0.0022 439 0.296 
        
        
Table 3: Gridlock and Polarization - Institutional Model, con't       
Congress Constant Mem Pol Prez ID Maj Coal Super Maj N Adj R2 
President Nay 
Position       
80 .1944*** -0.1322 0.5450*** 0.4305*** 0.2996*** 420 0.6636
a
 
81 .7104*** -1.030*** 0.9581*** 0.0632^ -0.0476 364 0.6410
a
 
82 .8434*** -0.0877 0.2828** -0.7776*** -0.1342** 421 0.7978 
83 .8650*** -0.1683^ -0.1978*** 0.0084 -0.0868^ 419 0.0622
a
 
84 .3702*** -0.1909* -0.4872*** 0.2803*** 0.1156* 437 0.6013
a
 
85 .5811*** -0.2641*** -0.2447*** 0.1030** 0.0059 441 0.5039 
86 .3932*** -0.2914*** -0.2920*** 0.3969*** 0.2479*** 438 0.8010
a
 
87 .5185*** -0.3529*** 0.6368*** -0.4234*** -0.1569*** 444 0.8786
a
 
88        
89 .8607*** -0.0882* 0.2344*** -0.0979** -0.0376 439 0.5759
a
 
90 .7229*** -0.2033*** 0.3508*** -0.0965** -0.017 434 0.6009 
91 .5607*** -0.1402* -0.3103*** 0.2058*** 0.1047** 435 0.7809
a
 
92 .2757*** 0.0795 -0.6604*** 0.0299 -0.0458 438 0.6586
a
 
93 .5011*** -0.1676* -0.3799*** 0.1777** 0.0916* 441 0.8555
a
 
94 .3832*** -0.3198*** -0.5662*** 0.2381*** 0.1030** 438 0.8938
a
 
95 .3387*** -0.0475 0.2565*** 0.0674* -0.0073 437 0.1902 
96 .9220*** -0.1861*** -0.0847* -0.1009*** -0.1042*** 437 0.1121 
97 .4999*** -0.3745*** -0.5594*** 0.1053*** 0.0694** 437 0.8687
a
 
98 .4854*** -0.3904*** -0.5344*** 0.0918*** 0.0363* 437 0.9310
a
 
99 .4237*** -0.3965*** -0.6442*** 0.1028** 0.0470* 437 0.9351
a
 
100 .5847*** -0.4553*** -0.5752*** 0.0349^ -0.0247 439 0.9441
a
 
101 .4765*** -0.3359*** -0.5270*** 0.1297*** 0.0428* 440 0.9362
a
 
102 .3606*** -0.2132*** -0.4808*** 0.2035*** 0.1058*** 436 0.9221
a
 
103 .5846*** -0.4526*** 0.3187** -0.041 -0.0455 434 0.3001 
104 .3752*** -0.4313*** 0.7991*** -0.0088 -0.0028 445 0.9325
a
 
105 .3369*** -0.347*** 0.7484*** 0.0091 0.0124 442 0.9303 
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